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Overview of Space Station Freedom
Avionics Design for Critical Functions
John Rush
NASA Space Station Freedom Program Office
Rest on, Virginia

Space Station Freedom will be an
orbiting
laboratory
facility
resulting from a major investment by
the
United
States
and
its
International
Partners.
It
is
imperative
that
Space
Station
Freedom's
avionics
system
be
designed to be robust and capable of
performing the critical functions
necessary to protect our investment
in this unique resource. This paper
provides an overview of the design
of the avionics system with regard
to its resilient failure tolerant
architecture.
I. Introduction
Space Station Freedom (SSF) will be an orbiting laboratory
facility that will host a wide range of payloads during its thirty
year lifetime. Each payload will require some set of facility
resources and/Or services such as electric power, heat dissipation,
data services, manned attendance, etc. To provide these resources
and services, and to maintain SSF as an orbiting manned vehicle,
SSF will have a set of distributed systems, each providing a
Specific resource or service function.
In this paper the systems of interest will be those that have
their functionality controlled by the SSF's avionics computers.
Those systems and their principle functions are:
1) Electric Power System (EPS): Provides electrical power
and power distribution to SSF electronic system and
payload equipment.
2) Guidance, Navigation, and Control/Propulsion (GNCP):
Provides SSF's attitude determination, attitude control,
and maintains orbital altitude.
3) Data Management System (DMS): Provides the software
execution, man-machine interface, data storage, and data
transport resources and services used in the avionics
system.
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4) Thermal Control System (TCS): Provides heat dissipation
services for SSF equipment.
5) Communication and Tracking System (CTS): Provides
spacecraft to ground communication services via the
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and crew
video and audio services.
6) Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS):
Maintains atmosphere in pressurized elements/ controls
water and waste processing, and provides fire detectipn
and suppression.
7) Mobile Servicing System (MSS): Provides robotic services
for maintenance and equipment transport outside of the
pressurized elements.
8) Payload Executive System (PES) : Provides management ojf
payload execution.
Each of the above systems perform functions that are needed to
make SSF an operating laboratory facility. For SSF to perform its
mission all system provided functions should be available all the
time. However , although each system's components will be
times
designed to a high degree of reliability, there will be
during the thirty year mission of SSF when system components will
fail. A way to enhance the availability of system functionality is
to implement redundant system components in the design together
with a mechanism to detect failures and switch in the redundant
units when necessary. Of course, the addition of multiple redundant
components adds weight, cost, and complexity to the overall
spacecraft design. Therefore, the redundant component approach to
assuring system function availability should be used selectively,
concentrating on those system functions that are most vital.

II. A Functional Partition Model
The top level system function partitioning model depicted in
figure 1 partitions the SSF system functions into three groups. The
partitions are based upon the relative consequences to SSF
resulting from loss of a system's function. The determination of
the consequences of the loss of system functionality must consider
a number of factors:
1) SSF systems are being designed to be maintainable
on-orbit. Thus, system functionality can be restored
by maintenance action by the crew.
2) Although SSF is being designed to be a permanently
manned spacecraft, it will spend long periods of time
in an unmanned state before Permanently Manned
Capability (PMC) is achieved.
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3) Some of the systems listed above perform functions
that are vital for the SSF to survive as an orbiting
spacecraft. Others, though necessary for SSF
mission success, do not pose immediate catastrophic
consequences to the spacecraft if the system's
functional capability were lost.
For example , a loss of the GNCP system would result in the
inability of the spacecraft to maintain attitude determination and
control r thus leading to the inability to point solar arrays for
power generation, point communication antennas for acquisition of
TDRSS satellites, and place SSF in a stable attitude for shuttle
docking. During unmanned operations such a function loss would be
especially critical and could jeopardize station survival, since
the next maintenance opportunity could be months away. On the other
hand, loss of the PES system would hamper payload operations and
endanger mission performance, however, as long as the other SSF
system functions are being performed the PES could be restored to
operational status through crew maintenance action at the next
available opportunity.
A major functional partition in figure 1 is that between
payload operations and core system functions. The payload operation
functions are those that are necessary to keep the SSF payload
compliment running and fully provided with facility services. The
core system functions are those functions that are needed to keep
SSF operating as an orbiting manned laboratory.
The core systems can be further partitioned into a set of
essential functions needed for spacecraft survival and a set of
spacecraft facility functions that support manned operations. As
shown in figure 1, the essential system functions needed for
spacecraft survival include the Electric Power System (EPS) .
Without electrical power, of course, no avionics function can be
performed. GNCP system functions are also in the essential
functions set. Without maintenance of spacecraft attitude it would
be impossible to point the EPS solar panels correctly, dock the
orbiter to the station, or to reboost the station to maintain
orbital altitude. In order to keep the avionics system operating,
the various avionics components must be kept within their operating
temperature range. Therefore, the Thermal Control System (TCS)
function must also be included in the set of spacecraft essential
functions.
Together, the EPS, GNCP, and TCS systems alone can maintain
the spacecraft in a stable orbital state for a few days. If the SSF
were unmanned, in order to maintain a stable state over a longer
period of time it would be necessary for ground controllers to
communicate with the operating systems onboard. For example,
synchronizing reboost activity with orbiter rendezvous plans and
moving the Station to docking attitude would require ground
commanding. Therefore, the Communication and Tracking System (CTS)
must also be added to the set of spacecraft essential functions.
However, it should be noted that only the S-band functional
capability of CTS is really needed in this minimum set of survival
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functions. The Data Management System (DMS) is fundamental for any
avionics function to be performed and therefore must be included in
the set of spacecraft essential functions also. Those core system
functions not included in the spacecraft essential function set in
figure 1 are placed in the set of system functions needed to
provide important laboratory facility capabilities. Included in the
spacecraft facility functions are those system functions needed to
conduct robotic servicing of truss mounted system components and
the movement of equipment and payloads exterior to the pressurized
modules. The man critical systems depicted in figure 1 are those
that maintain the pressure , temperature, humidity, and breathable
atmosphere aboard SSF and provide the general support services
needed for manned operations, both inside and outside of the
pressurized modules,
III. A Channelized Architecture
Each of the core systems is being designed with redundant
components such that failure of a single component will not
terminate performance of the system's function. For the systems
performing spacecraft essential functions there will be triple
component redundancy so that the system will continue to perform
its functions even with two component failures.
An additional consideration in the design of SSF systems is
that all system components depend upon power , data, and thermal
resources and services. Therefore failures in EPS, DMS, or TCS
components could propagate throughout other spacecraft systems. In
order to prevent this from happening the core systems will
implement a channelized design approach for connectivity of power,
data, and thermal resources to core system components. In this
channelized approach each core system has its components connected
to form fault containment domains that resist propagation of a
fault from one domain into the others.
A system performing a spacecraft essential function will have
a minimum of three fault containment domains such that no two
failures can disable the system from performing its functions, i.e.
the system is two failure tolerant. The remainder of the core
system functions, i.e. the spacecraft facility functions in figure
1, will be channelized into a minimum of two fault containment
domains each, thus making them one failure tolerant systems.
Figure 2 illustrates how system components will be channelized
into fault containment domains. In this case the fault containment
domains for GN&C are depicted for the attitude determination
function. The attitude determination function requires that the
GN&C process control computer be connected to at least one Star
Tracker (ST) or an Inertial Sensor Assembly (ISA). GN&C actually
has four fault containment domains with respect to its own
components, data bus connections, and power supplies. With respect
to thermal services there are three fault containment domains since
the Moderate Temperature Loop (MTL) of the TCS cools EPS equipment
for power buses 3 and 4. Thus from the figure 2 diagram it can be
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shown that there is no combination of two failures, either in GN&C
components or power, data, or thermal connections, that would
result in loss of the essential attitude determination function.
IV. Failure Protection at the System Control Level
Each of the core systems is controlled by computer programs
executing in one of four SDPs. Figure 3 depicts the four computers
and their power, data, and thermal connectivity. In order to
maintain core system failure tolerance the controlling computers
must have power, data, and thermal connectivity that is two failure
tolerant.
There will be eighteen buses used for data connection of core
system components to the controlling SDPs. Each of the four SDPs
will be connected to all eighteen data buses therefore allowing any
of the four SDPs to run any core system's control program.
In order to protect against power failures each SDP will have
at least two separate sources of power. In addition, three separate
cooling loops will provide heat dissipation to the four computers.
The net result of the design for the core system control
computers will be that no two failures of SDPs or their power,
data, or thermal connections will result in loss of core system
control processing. Therefore, the design will compliment the
robust fault containment architecture for the each of the core
systems.

V. Conclusion
The SSF avionics system design provides a resilient survival
capability for the spacecraft where essential functions are at
least two failure tolerant. A channelized architecture includes
provisions for protection against failures in power, data, and
thermal resource distribution to system components. The core system
control computers are designed to assume control of any core system
and are also protected from failures in power and thermal
distribution channels.
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